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AVENUES FOR ADDRESSING THE EXPLOITATION OF  
INTER PARTES REVIEW PROCESS BY THIRD PARTIES 
Yishi Yin* 
An innovative new technique for gaming the financial markets 
emerged in late 2014 when a hedge fund manager began filing 
inter partes review petitions with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office against pharmaceutical companies in an attempt 
to profit from the short selling of pharmaceutical stocks. The 
pharmaceutical industry deemed this practice an abuse of process 
and attempted to regulate and deter these tactics by protesting to 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board to sanction those who use the 
strategy and for the Patent and Trademark office to issue a new 
policy banning the strategy. However, the Board declined to 
impose sanctions on hedge fund manager Kyle Bass for abuse of 
process. Options to halt the strategy include Congressional action, 
agency action, and Judicial Review of the Patent and Trademark 
Office’s ruling. This Recent Development will present means of 
regulating this activity and ultimately argue that the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board made the best decision by leaving the issue for 
Congressional action. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is 
the federal agency responsible for granting United States patents in 
accordance with Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the U.S. 
Constitution to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; About Us, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
about-us (last visited Oct. 20 2015). 
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In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (“AIA”) and established broad patent reform.2 One of the 
reforms was the establishment of the inter partes review (“IPR”) 
system for challenging the validity of patents at the USPTO 
through the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).3 As part of 
an investment strategy, the manager of the hedge fund Hayman 
Capital Management LP, Kyle Bass, targeted pharmaceutical drug 
patents with IPR petitions primarily as a method to short sell 
stocks.4 Bass filed the IPRs using a series of shell companies he 
created as limited liability companies (“LLC”).5 
The LLCs are named the Coalition for Affordable Drugs 
(“CFAD”) and serve the purpose to invalidate weak 
pharmaceutical patents so generic pharmaceutical companies can 
move in and lower drug prices, while also serving his own purpose 
in enabling him to short sell related stock.6 Bass and his CFADs 
have filed more than thirty-two IPR petitions and, regardless of the 
IPR outcomes, show no sign of slowing down.7 Bass’s actions have 
                                                
 2 See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 341 (2011). 
 3 Id. For a description of IPR and the PTAB, see infra, Part II. 
 4 For a description of short selling stocks, see infra, Part II.A. 
 5 Don Seiffert, Kyle Bass has lost a battle, but not the war, in his fight with 
Big Pharma, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/bioflash/2015/09/kyle-bass-has-lost-a-
battle-but-not-the-war-in.html. Bass has announced that his Coalitions are 
additionally meant to introduce cheaper generics by invalidating weak patents 
that drive drug prices up; however, he has also commented that motive is 
“incidental” to his hedge fund managing strategy. Id. For a detailed discussion 
on shorting stock, see infra, Part II.B. 
 6 Ed Silverstein, Should hedge funds have standing in IPR?, INSIDE COUNSEL 
(July 22, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/07/22/should-hedge-funds-
have-standing-in-ipr. 
 7 Kristel Schorr et al., The Road Ahead For Kyle Bass’s IPRs, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/696911/the-road-ahead-for-kyle-bass-s-
iprs; Susan Decker, Bass Vows to Keep Fighting U.S. Drug Patents After Setbacks, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 03, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-09-03/bass-vows-to-keep-fighting-u-s-drug-patents-after-setbacks. 
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caused some pharmaceutical companies to cry abuse,8 and a few 
targeted companies have filed for sanctions 9  or argue in 
preliminary responses that there is an abuse of process.10 Despite 
immense success in bringing down stock prices with his first three 
IPR challenges by just filing the challenge, the market seems to 
have either adjusted to Bass’s tactics or learned about the possible 
volatility of patents, as his later challenges have not all led to a 
significant decrease in stock prices of the targeted companies.11 
The PTAB tackled the issue of using the IPR process to short stock 
head-on in a ruling denying sanctions, stating that “[p]rofit is at the 
heart of nearly every patent and nearly every inter partes review.”12 
More recently, the PTAB has instituted review on seven of 
CFAD’s petitions, 13  as well as another hedge fund’s petition, 
giving some credence to the investment strategy.14 However, the 
                                                
 8 Schorr et al., supra note 7. “Biotechnology Industry Organization’s (BIO) 
president and CEO Jim Greenwood has said, ‘Billionaire hedge fund manager 
Kyle Bass continues to attack biotechnology companies with endless series of 
IPR . . . challenges to legitimate patents. . . . His abuse of this system highlights 
the need for reform.’” Ed Silverstein, Bass wins single victory at PTAB but 
questions remain who will lose ‘war’, INSIDE COUNSEL (October 2015). 
 9 Id. 
 10 Decker, supra note 7, at 3. 
 11 See J. Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Attack of The Shorting Bass: Does 
the Inter Partes Review Process Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?, 
63 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse (forthcoming Nov. 2015). 
 12 Ryan Davis, Hedge Fund Gets PTAB To Eye VirnetX Patents In Apple 
Case, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712078/hedge-
fund-gets-ptab-to-eye-virnetx-patents-in-apple-case; Lisa Shuchman, Kyle Bass 
Wins a Procedural Victory in Battle Against Big Pharma, CORPORATE 
COUNSEL. (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202738395997/ 
Kyle-Bass-Wins-a-Procedural-Victory-in-Battle-Against-Big-Pharma?slreturn= 
20151006134353. 
 13 Tasha M. Francis, Kyle Bass Group Gets PTAB to Review 4 Celgene 
Patents, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=f426cc1a-ce41-4347-8640-9e1049f5a6c4. 
 14 Matthew Bultman, Hedge Fund Group Gets Review Of Bowel Disease Drug 
Patent, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/712592/ hedge-
fund-group-gets-review-of-bowel-disease-drug-patent; Davis, supra note 12. 
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fear is that this investment strategy could spur copycat15 financiers 
to adopt his strategy and clog the IPR proceedings with dubious 
petitions backed by pure financial motivations and stymying 
innovation by introducing a next-generation IPR troll. 16  This 
Recent Development argues that the USPTO’s policy, revealed in 
the PTAB’s recent ruling, is correct because the PTAB did not act 
and contravene express statutes, despite the USPTO having the 
power to address the issue with more force that lies within its 
Constitutional charge, 17  delegated powers, 18  and status as a 
“custodian of knowledge.” Furthermore, this Recent Development 
addresses other avenues for dealing with the “next-generation ‘IPR 
troll[s]’”,19 such as Congressional action, Securities and Exchange 
Commission and USPTO action, and judicial review. 
Part II introduces how the current laws and regulations operate, 
including short sales, IPR petitions, and the motivations for its 
implementation. Part III discusses Bass’s strategy and the 
exploitation of the IPR process for pecuniary gain. Part IV 
evaluates whether any intervention is required. Part V addresses 
methods the USPTO could employ to respond to the exploitation 
of the IPR system. Part VI concludes that that the USPTO and 
PTAB were in waiting for Congress to provide guidance and 
address the issue while deciding the IPR petitions based on the 
merits of the claims. 
                                                
 15 Some other hedge funds and financiers have filed petitions in order to short 
stock. See Michelle Carniaux, PTAB Crashers: A Look at how they are doing in 
the PTAB, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/ 
detail.aspx?g=89b0247b-5614-4819-a0f2-bd3f999e6a4e. 
 16 Joseph Allen, It’s Time to Whack ‘IPR Trolls’, IPWATCHDOG (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/06/22/its-time-to-whack-ipr-trolls/id=58902/. 
 17 “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries[.]” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 18 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 19 Schorr et al., supra note 7, at 26. 
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II. SHORT SALES, THE AIA, AND INTER PARTES REVIEW 
A. Short Selling of Stocks 
With the 2008 recession still fresh in mind, the country 
continues to scrutinize and criticize the activities of Wall Street, 
including the practice of short selling.20 Investments in stocks can 
be split into two categories: long and short.21 When an investor 
“goes long,” they are betting that the stock will gradually increase 
in price, and plan to gain from selling at a higher price. 22 
Conversely, when they “go short,” they are taking the gamble that 
the stock price will decrease in the near future.23 In a typical short 
sale, a seller borrows shares of stock and then sells stock that he or 
she believes will fall in price. After the stock price has fallen, the 
short seller then re-purchases the stock at the lower price,24 and 
returns the stock to the lender.25 If the buy-back price is lower than 
the selling price, the short seller gains a profit, which is the 
difference between the selling price and the buy-back price, from 
that transaction. The short selling of stocks was once deemed “the 
greatest evil that has been permitted or sanctioned by the 
                                                
 20 Short selling in the struggling financial industry was widely debated to be a 
major contributor to the 2008 market crash and subsequent recession, one still 
fresh in the minds of public. Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the 
Global Regulation of Short Sales: Why Prohibition is Inefficient and Disclosure 
Insufficient, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 376, 380 (2010). 
 21 Short Selling: What is Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2015). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 There is no requirement to re-purchase the stock from the buyer. For 
instance, the short seller can simply purchase the amount of borrowed stock 
from any seller in the market. 
 25 Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium on the Regulation of Secondary Trading 
Markets: Program Trading, Volatility, Portfolio Insurance, and the Role of 
Specialists and Market Makers: Restrictions on Short Sales: an Analysis of the 
Uptick Rule and its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1989). For regulation of short sales, see 
generally 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2015). 
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Government . . . .” 26  Some conventional investors view short 
sellers negatively because they are betting on bad news, such as a 
company’s economic struggle. 27  Some also believe that short 
sellers are heavy contributors to market crashes and recessions, 
partly because they gain tremendously—while most investors lose 
financially—when stock prices drop, and because they capitalize 
on market fear and panic.28 There are even a few “bad apples” that 
take the short position on a stock and disseminate unsubstantiated 
rumors and bad news to drive down stock prices and gain from the 
artificially low price of the stock.29 
Despite the negative perception of short sales, “a large number 
of empirical studies indicate that short selling is an important 
factor of market efficiency when it comes to pricing of securities 
and rapid dissemination of unpublished information.”30 However, 
one persistent concern is the possibility of using short sales “in 
order to . . . act profitably on inside information.”31 While the fear 
of market manipulation and threat of insider trading exists, those 
                                                
 26 Short Selling of Securities: Hearings on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638, H.R. 
4639 Before the H. Comm’n on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7 
(1932). 
 27  Bridget Yullie, Short Selling: Ethics and the Role of Short Selling, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling4.asp 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. See generally Rick Wayman, The Short and Distort: Stock Manipulation 
in a Bear Market, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/analyst/ 
030102.asp (Last Visited Oct. 31, 2015); David P. McCaffery, Review of The 
Policy Debate Over Short Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73.2 Alb. 
L. Rev. 483 (2010), http://www.albany.edu/McCaffrey-Short-Sale-
Regulation.pdf. In recent news, “Biotech bad boy” Martin Shkreli had also 
attempted a similar hedge fund strategy as Bass, but instead petitioned Food and 
Drug Administration to not approve drugs while holding those pharmaceutical 
companies’ stocks in a short position. Ed Silverman, Biotech exec Martin 
Shkreli has a history of tough tactics, BOS. GLOBE (September 26, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/09/25/how-martin-shkreli-biotech-
pariah-put-cancer-patients-risk/fxjUV8alj28LESmmOF7IbO/story.html. 
 30 Avgouleas, supra note 20, at 379, 403. 
 31 Id. at 379. 
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issues are under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchanges 
Commission (“SEC”).32 
B. The AIA and IPR 
In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) was 
signed into law by President Obama with broad patent reform in 
mind. One stated purpose was to “establish a more efficient and 
streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and 
limit unnecessary and counter-productive litigation costs.”33 The 
AIA changed the United States patent filing system from a first-to-
invent system to a first-to-file system mirroring the laws of many 
other countries, which also reduced litigation costs by reducing 
interference proceedings.34 Among other changes, the AIA also 
created a “toolbox of new or fortified proceedings” to “weed out” 
suspect or “low quality” patents that should have never been 
initially issued, which the IPR proceeding is a part of.35 An IPR 
allows any person or company to request that the USPTO, through 
                                                
 32 “[A]ll investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should 
have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so 
long as they hold it.” The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation. SEC: WHAT WE 
DO. http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml. 
 33 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/ 
press/senate-begins-debate-on-leahy-smith-america-invents-act. 
 34 A patent is available as prior art on the date the patent or patent application 
was effectively filed, the actual date, or the earliest application date if the patent 
or patent application is entitled to claim a right of foreign priority or domestic 
benefit and describes the subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2012); America 
Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED STATES PATENTED AND 
TRADE OFFICE, www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-
act-aia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked. Interference proceedings were 
previously used to determine the priority of inventions, (who invented what 
first). It was estimated that the proceeding would cost an average of $600,000, 
which generally only wealthy inventors or corporations could afford. See Gene 
Quinn, Change? Derviation May Feel a Lot Like Interference Practice, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/09/change-
derviation-may-feel-a-lot-like-interference-practice/id=24020/. 
 35 Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
487, 498-99 (Dec. 2012). 
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the PTAB,36 review a granted patent to reconsider whether the 
challenged patent satisfies two conditions for patentability: novelty 
and non-obviousness.37 A person who is not the owner of a patent 
is able to file a petition to institute an IPR of a patent, and if there 
is a reasonable likelihood that a petitioner can prevail with at least 
one of the claims in the petition challenged, review will be 
instituted.38 If review is instituted, the petitioner has the burden of 
proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a patent 
claim is invalid.39 In line with the mission of the AIA to streamline 
the system, the IPR procedure ensures that the PTAB will aim to 
contemplate more petitions by requiring the PTAB to reach a 
decision in instituting review within three months of receiving a 
patent owner’s preliminary response to petition,40 and reach final 
decisions of validity in not over one year since the date of 
                                                
 36 The Patent Trial and Appeal Board was created by 35 U.S.C. § 6, and it is 
the judicial arm of the USPTO. The Board’s duties consist of: 
(1) on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of 
examiners upon applications for patents pursuant to section 134(a); 
(2) review appeals of reexaminations pursuant to section 134(b); 
(3) conduct derivation proceedings pursuant to section 135; and 
(4) conduct inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews pursuant to 
chapters 31 and 32.  
35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2012). 
 37 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012). For an invention to be novel, it must not 
be described in any other patent, printed publication, or widely known; for an 
invention to be non-obvious, it should display “ingenuity beyond the compass” 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art, meaning that the differences between the 
invention and any prior art must not be so trivial that one of ordinary skill in the 
art could easily see it is already known in whole, or in part from separate 
references. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2012); UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO Inter Partes Review, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 38 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Inter Partes Review, 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/tri 
als/inter-partes-review (last visited Sept. 26, 2015). 
 39 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012). 
 40 Or if the patent owner chooses not to file a preliminary response, the last 
date of response eligibility. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) (2012). 
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institution of review.41 IPR is often considerably less expensive 
than full litigation.42 One reason IPR can be less expensive and 
more expedient than patent litigation is because courts often 
repeatedly grant a stay if there happens to be any pending litigation 
within the district courts, conserving resources while waiting for 
the “tech-savvy” PTAB to come to a decision.43 Adding to the 
price and speed calculus is the fact that IPR proceedings have a 
lower standard of proof than at trial for determining a patent 
claim’s validity: a preponderance of the evidence.44 The reduction 
                                                
 41 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012). As of September 14, 2014, IPR petitions 
have seen an average 75 petitions per month, compared to 12.5 Inter Partes 
Reexamination (“IPX”) petitions per month; IPR decisions are, on average, 
rendered within 15 months, compared the average 36 months under IPX. See 
Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014). 
 42  For example, Engellenger estimates IPR proceedings to cost roughly 
$300,000–500,000, while full litigation could be from $2 million - $6 million. 
Tom Engellenger, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Comparison of Federal 
Court, ITC, and USPTO Proceedings in IP Disputes, slide 31. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-inJapan/Commit 
tee%20Documents/2014%20MWI%20Presentations/Tom%20Engellenner%20-
%20IP%20Dispute%20Cost%20Comparison.ppt. See generally Eric W. 
Schweibenz et al., Automatic Stay of Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review?: A 
Simple Proposal for Solving the Patent Troll Riddle, 7 ABA SECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LANDSLIDE 1LAW (2014), http://www.oblon.com/ 
content/uploads/2015/08/ABA_LAND_v007n01__automatic_stay_of_litigation
_pending_inter_partes_review_a_simple_proposal_for_solving_the_patent_troll
_riddle-authcheckdam.pdf. 
 43 Schweibenz et al., supra note 42 at 2–3. Courts usually use a three factor 
test to determine whether a stay in proceedings is appropriate: (1) the stage of 
the litigation, (2) simplification of the issues in or at trial, and (3) whether a stay 
will create undue prejudice to the nonmoving party or a clear tactical advantage 
to the moving party. See Telemac Corp. v. Teledigital, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 
1107, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006). There is a “liberal policy in favor of granting 
motions to stay proceedings pending the outcome of USPTO reexamination or 
reissuance proceedings.” ASCII Corp. v. STD Entnmen’t USA, Inc., 844 F. 
Supp. 1378, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 44 The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that one or more claims of the patent in suit are invalid.
 
At court, there 
is a presumption of validity of a granted patent against which the alleged 
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in cost and time make IPR an attractive vehicle for hedge fund 
managers, such as Bass, that have taken short positions on 
pharmaceutical stocks and are looking to manipulate share prices 
for profit.45 
The USPTO has limited resources. The USPTO’s budget, 
although set by Congress, comes entirely from the fees it collects 
instead of taxpayer dollars.46 Because of the constrained budget, 
manpower is also limited.47 Compounding the limited resources is 
the growing popularity of IPRs; IPR petitions have increased from 
an average of forty-one per month, in fiscal year 2013, to 142 per 
month in fiscal year 2015.48 
The hedge fund strategy of CFAD and its copycats is not 
entirely aligned with the stated goals of the AIA, or the overall 
goals of the patent system given the resources of the USPTO. The 
IPR process is susceptible to exploitation because IPR petitions are 
more enticing than full-blown litigation; any third parties, for 
instance, financiers, are allowed to challenge patent validity. IPR 
petitions already comprise 90% of total petitions before the 
                                                                                                         
infringer then bears the burden of disproving by clear and convincing evidence. 
Sidak & Skog, supra note 11, at 5. 
 45 Id. at 5–6. 
 46 The budget for the US Patent and Trademark Office is set before the office 
knows know how much is collected in fees. For instance, the fee for IPR petition 
request for up to 20 claims is $9,000. This goes to the Patent and Trademark Fee 
Reserve Fund, and can be accessed upon Congressional grant, if the Office has 
collected more fees than the budget set. Ryan Davis, Obama Budget Calls For 
$252M Less For USPTO, LAW360, (Feb. 2, 2015, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/617421/obama-budget-calls-for-252m-less-for-
uspto; see also Patent Trial and Appeal Fees, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule (last visited Nov. 
23, 2015). 
 47 If the budget is set, salaries and the number of examiners are set. In 2014, 
there were 9,302 patent examiners. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2014), 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf. 
 48 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/2015-04-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 117 
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review 
PTAB.49 CFAD’s tactics will undermine the agency’s ability to 
efficiently and effectively deal with patent challenges through IPR 
because CFAD is consuming the USPTO’s resources for purely 
financial gain without any interest in using a particular technology 
or in innovation by further development. Other copycats have 
already adopted his method and have filed IPR petitions while 
taking the short position, which will further slow down the IPR 
process and PTAB proceedings.50 Because the PTAB requires a 
decision on institution to be within three months of response and 
any final decision to be within a year of institution, the PTAB 
might become inundated with these types of IPR petitions if they 
continuously receive more IPR petitions. The PTAB may also 
struggle to give full attention to each petition, unless the USPTO 
massively expands the PTAB. Other concerns motivating the 
passage of the AIA, such as attempts to curtail short selling, will be 
discussed in Parts III and IV.51 
III. COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE DRUGS’  STRATEGY 
Although certainly not the first to capitalize on market 
uneasiness,52 Bass has ingeniously constructed his strategy. Instead 
of filing IPR petitions under his holding company, Hayman Capital 
Management, he files his IPR petitions using one of his shell 
CFADs.53 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) has been interpreted to give any 
person the ability to challenge a patent;54 this allows an entity such 
                                                
 49 Id. at 2. 
 50 Davis, supra note 12. 
 51 See infra Part III and Part IV. 
 52 William A. Ackman, a hedge fund manager, is using a similar tactic by 
undermining market confidence in Herbalife with threats of legal action and 
lobbying efforts, all the while taking the short position on its stock. Michael S. 
Schmidt et al., After Big Bet, Hedge Fund Pulls the Levers of Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/business/staking-1-
billion-that-herbalife-will-fail-then-ackman-lobbying-to-bring-it-down.html?_r=1. 
 53 Sidak & Skog, supra note 11; his CFADs are registered limited liability 
companies. 
 54 Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, 
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015). 
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as a hedge fund to file an IPR petition.55 Although the actual 
motivation behind the use of a CFAD instead of his hedge fund 
company is not entirely clear, Bass contends that his CFADs were 
formed for a legitimate and altruistic rationale: to challenge “weak 
patents in an effort to lower drug prices.” 56  Instead, the 
pharmaceutical industry contends that Bass and other hedge fund 
managers are filing these IPR petitions in order to create market 
fear about the viability of a pharmaceutical company’s patents, 
which drives down stock prices. 57  They suggest that there is 
“nothing in this man’s history to suggest he has any interest in 
lowering health-care costs,” and point out his partnership with 
well-known “patent-troll”58 Erich Spangenberg.59 Drug company 
Celgene,60 one of Bass’s targets, filed a motion for sanctions61 in 
                                                
 55 “Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is not the owner of 
a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of 
the patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). 
 56 Tasha Francis, Kyle Bass’ IPRs: Are You Next?, FISH & RICHARDSON (Sept. 
8, 2015), http://fishpostgrant.com/alert/kyle-bass-iprs-are-you-next/. 
 57 Shuchman, supra note 12. 
 58 A patent troll is usually someone who has no interest in the technology or 
industry, but buys weak and dubious patents and then threatens litigation 
utilizing those patents as a weapon. Their targets are either tolled a licensing fee 
or settlement fee to avoid costly litigation. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: 
An Alert to Corporate America (July 13, 2013), N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-to-
corporate-america.html; Matteo Sabatini, NPEs vs. Patent Trolls: How to Build 
a Healthy Innovation Ecosystem, IPWATCHDOG, (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/04/npe-patent-trolls-innovation-ecosystem/ 
id=54427/ (Non-practicing entities (NPEs) are patent owners that have no 
interest in using or developing the patented invention, although not all NPEs are 
patent trolls.). 
 59 Erich Spangenberg has been called “one of the most notorious patent trolls 
in America” and is infamous within the patent-troll world. Earning over $25 
million a year with IPNav, his business mainly centered on trolling patents, 
which has sued 1,638 companies as of 2013. Segal, supra note 58; Joseph 
Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short 
the Stock, WSJ (April 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-
manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408. 
 60 See About Celgene, CELGENE CORP., https://www.celgene.com/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
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the PTAB criticizing Bass for his activities, claiming that his 
CFADs and his altruistic motives are a “front” and his motives a 
“pretext” for manipulating stock prices and profiting from shorting 
their stock.62 In response to the motion for sanctions from Celgene, 
CFAD stated its petitions “are part of its investment strategy, and 
[CFAD] will only succeed by invalidating patents, serving the 
socially valuable purpose of reducing drug prices artificially priced 
above the socially optimum level.”63 
A. Early Failures of Institution 
In late August 2015, the PTAB declined to institute two of 
Bass’s earlier IPR petitions against Acorda Therapeutics and its 
Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”) drug Ampyra.64 CFAD claimed that two 
posters presented at meetings qualified as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                         
 61 Patent Owner Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) and 
37 C.F.R. § 42.12, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., 
IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2015); sanctions under 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.12(a)(6) state that the PTAB may impose a sanction against a party for 
abuse of process. Section 42.12(b) lists possible sanctions, and the most 
applicable sanctions are: “[a]n order providing for compensatory expenses, 
including attorney fees” and “[j]udgment in the trial or dismissal of the 
petition.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(b) (2015); “[i]n all [thirteen] cases in which a Patent 
Owner Preliminary Response has been filed to date, the patent owner has argued 
that CFAD’s petition is an abuse of process or otherwise contrary to the 
underlying intent of the AIA. In five cases, the patent owner has filed a separate 
motion for sanctions based on abuse of process, and in at least one other case, 
the PTAB has authorized the patent owner to file such a motion.” Schorr et al., 
supra note 7. The Director of the USPTO has the power to prescribe sanctions 
for “abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any other improper use of the 
proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary 
increase in the cost of the proceeding.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) (2012). 
 62 Beth Winegarner, Celgene Calls Kyle Bass’ AIA Review Bids ‘Harassment’, 
LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/701833. 
 63 Davis, supra note 12. 
 64 Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. 
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., IPR2015-00817 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs]; Erin Coe, 
Hedge Fund Manager Loses IPR Bids Against Acorda, LAW360 (Aug. 24, 
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/694762/hedge-fund-manager-loses-ipr-
bids-against-acorda. 
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§ 102(b).65 The PTAB denied review based on the fact that CFAD 
failed to establish a reasonable likelihood it would prevail with at 
least one of their claims within the petition.66 In early September 
2015, the PTAB also declined to institute a review of a third IPR 
against Biogen MA (“Biogen”) and its MS drug Tecfidera.67 The 
PTAB stated the reason for denying the IPR was “based on 
petitioner’s failure to establish a likelihood of success as to any 
challenged claim.” 68  The PTAB did not address arguments 
surrounding an abuse of process investigation through Biogen’s 
motion for additional discovery, going so far as stating in the 
Biogen case that “additional discovery . . . would be inconsistent 
with a speedy and inexpensive resolution”69 based on 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.1(b).70 
B. Validation as an Investment Strategy 
In early October 2015, CFAD and other hedge funds71 were 
awarded two significant victories for their use of IPR as an 
investment strategy. One was the denial of a motion for sanctions 
in the Celgene case.72 Celgene filed a motion for sanctions in front 
of the PTAB that alleged that CFAD’s and Bass’s investment 
strategy was an abuse of process.73 Celgene explained that the 
USPTO has not adopted any standards for what constitutes an 
abuse of process for IPRs, but suggested that an abuse of process 
                                                
 65 Decision Denying IPR, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, supra note 64 at 5. 
 66 Id. at 2. 
 67 Coalition for Affordable Drugs V, LLC v. Biogen MA, Inc., IPR2015-
01136 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Coalition for Affordable Drugs V]; 
Matthew Bultman, PTAB Denies Hedge Fund’s Bid For Biogen Patent Review, 
LAW360 (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/698466/ptab-denies-
hedge-fund-s-bid-for-biogen-patent-review. 
 68 Coalition for Affordable Drugs V, supra note 67 at 16. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id.; 37 C.F.R § 42.1(b) (2015) (stating “[t]his part shall be construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding”). 
 71 Another hedge fund is Mangrove Partners Masters Fund. Infra notes 87–91. 
 72 See generally Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable 
Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015). 
 73 Id. at 2. 
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occurs when a party perverts a “lawfully initiated process to 
illegitimate ends.”74 They argued that allowing CFAD to continue 
to file IPR petitions would result in an “unwarranted burden” on 
the PTAB, as well as other innovators.75 Celgene centered their 
arguments on three points: (1) the fact that CFAD had no 
underlying interest whatsoever on the technology contained in the 
patent, or any interest in the industry targeted; (2) the purposes of 
the AIA in establishing IPR was to decrease cost and time, and 
CFAD’s activity ran counter to this purpose; and (3) the fact that 
profit was the ulterior motive behind the IPR petitions. 76  On 
Celgene’s first point, the PTAB determined that Congress chose 
not to impose a requirement of specific interest in the technology 
covered by the patent when the PTAB interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 311, 
and this was consistent with standing principles in front of 
agencies.77 With regard to the Celgene’s second point, the purpose 
of the AIA and the newly introduced IPR procedure, the PTAB 
held that Congress did not only intend for the IPR process to be a 
less costly alternative, but also to streamline the patent system and 
improve patent quality. Therefore any meritorious challenge is 
adequate under the AIA’s stated goals.78 To Celgene’s third point, 
the PTAB chose to not take any position with regards to the profit 
motive, stating that “[p]rofit was at the heart of nearly every patent 
                                                
 74 Patent Owner Motion for Sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, 
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. July 28, 2015) (citing Heck v. 
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 n.5 (1994)). 
 75 Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, 
LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 
Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI]. 
 76 Id. at 2–3. 
 77 Id. at 4 (citing Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) 
(stating that an administrative agency is not subject to Article III of the 
Constitution of the United States, so a petitioner would have no need to establish 
standing to participate in proceedings before the agency); see also Consumer 
Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Res. Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(citing Sierra Club). 
 78 Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, supra note 75 at 4–5 Celgene did not 
allege that CFAD filed unmeritorious petitions in their motion for sanctions. Id. 
The PTAB declined to establish explicit elements for abuse of process, but 
decided that claims with merit are not sanctionable. Id. 
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and nearly every [IPR].”79 The PTAB went on to grant institution 
of CFAD’s petitions against Celgene’s drug patents, but declined 
to expound on the issue of exploitation.80 
The other significant win was a successful institution of review 
stemming from CFAD’s IPR petition against Cosmo.81 Cosmo’s 
preliminary response addressed the CFAD’s claims by arguing that 
they failed to meet the reasonable likelihood standard, but also 
attacked the CFAD by requesting that the IPR petition be 
dismissed because the CFAD failed to reveal all real parties in 
interest (“RPI”)82 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), which states 
that an IPR petition “may be considered only if . . . the petition 
identifies all [RPI].”83 Cosmo began by arguing that the CFAD’s 
                                                
 79 Id. at 3. 
 80 See, e.g., Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene 
Corp., IPR2015-01092, (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015); Decision, Coalition for 
Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01096 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 
2015); see also Francis, supra note 13. 
 81 Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies 
Ltd., IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015). 
 82 Who constitutes a RPI is a highly fact-dependent question; there is no 
bright-line test for determining the necessary quantity or degree of participation 
to qualify as a RPI based on the control concept. See Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. 
Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 759 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key Aspects of New 
Administrative Patent Trials, USPTO (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-act-aia/mess 
age-chief-judge-james-donald-smith-board#heading-2. “Accordingly, the Office 
has not enumerated particular factors regarding a ‘control’ theory of [RPI] . . . in 
the proposed rules. Instead, to resolve a real party in interest or privy dispute 
that may arise during a proceeding, the Board plans to consider each case on its 
specific facts.” Id. 
 83 “By neglecting to identify all of the ‘wealthy individuals and institutions’ 
invested in Mr. Bass’ fund and the myriad entities he has engaged to file such 
petitions, Petitioner has failed to comply with the explicit requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 312(a)(2).” Patent Owner Prelim. Resp., Coalition for Affordable 
Drugs II LLC v. Cosmo Technologies Ltd., No. IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 
7, 2015). See generally Krishan Thakker & Eldora L. Ellison, The Curious Case 
of RPIs & NPEs in IPRs, 90 PTCJ 3049 (Aug. 28, 2015). “There are multiple 
factors relevant to an RPI or privy inquiry, including the ‘existence of a 
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failure to disclose their sister CFADs, parent companies, as well as 
any investors that sponsor CFAD’s actions, is fatal to their 
petition.84 Cosmo ended its response by arguing that policy dictates 
that investors be disclosed as RPI in order to ensure “that IPRs are 
not used as tools for harassment . . . through repeated litigation and 
administrative attacks on the validity of a patent, which would 
divert resources from the research and development of 
inventions.”85 The PTAB reviewed on the merits in favor of the 
CFAD, but addressed the issue of RPI by finding that there was 
insufficient evidence that sister CFADs were required to be listed 
as RPI, and that investors were also too speculative to be required 
to be listed for this proceeding.86 
Also in October, a second hedge fund, Mangrove Partners 
Master Fund, was granted review for its IPR petition over VirnetX 
Inc., an Internet security company.87 In their preliminary response, 
VirnetX, similar to Cosmo, also attacked the petition by requesting 
that the PTAB dismiss the petition because Mangrove Fund failed 
to list all RPIs, including investors.88 Again, the PTAB ruled that 
there was insufficient evidence to require Mangrove Fund to do so 
at that stage of the proceeding.89 Furthermore, Mangrove Fund was 
                                                                                                         
financially controlling interest in the Petitioner’; the non- party’s ‘relationship 
with the Petitioner’; the nonparty’s ‘relationship to the petition itself, including 
the nature and/or degree of involvement in the filing’ (i.e., the amount of control 
and/or funding of the proceeding); and ‘the nature of the entity filing the 
petition.’” Id. at 2. The identity of RPIs is important because there a statutory 
bars that prevent a party from filing an IPR. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
 84 Coalition for Affordable Drugs II LLC, IPR2015-00988 at 34–41. 
 85 Id. at 41 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 48 (2011)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 86 Cosmo’s attempt to dismiss based on failure to identify all RPIs failed 
because those sister CFADs and investors have not been shown to be RPIs in 
this proceeding. Id. 
 87 Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, Inc., No. 
IPR2015-01046 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015). 
 88  Patent Owner’s Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. 
VirnetX, Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 2-13 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015). 
 89 Because the record does not reflect that Mangrove Fund is precluded from 
modifying the named RPIs to include the ones cited by patent owner, and 
because Mangrove Fund has not given evidence for whether there are any 
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not precluded from modifying its RPIs at a later time if necessary.90 
Also like Celgene, VirnetX attempted to argue that the filing of the 
petition was improper because Mangrove Fund was only interested 
in manipulating stock prices.91 VirnetX sought dismissal based on a 
similar theory of statutory interpretation in its preliminary 
response, citing language that the Director of the USPTO must 
consider the effects on the economy, integrity of the system, and 
efficient and timely administration of IPR in 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).92 
Together with the language in giving the Director  power to 
prescribe sanctions for improper use in 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(6)93 as 
giving the USPTO the authority to sanction and deter this type of 
investment strategy that exploits the IPR procedure.94 Again, the 
PTAB ruled that financial motivation was the heart of many IPRs, 
and stated, “economic motive for challenging a patent does not 
itself raise abuse of process issues.”95 
So far, the PTAB has announced that purely financial 
motivation does not close the door for financiers to file IPR 
petitions. It also announced that investment strategy is not a 
sanctionable action with regard to claims of abuse of process. 
However, the PTAB did not announce a standard for what is, but 
                                                                                                         
additional RPIs. Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, 
Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Patent Owners Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, 
Inc., No. IPR2015-01046 at 14 (P.T.A.B. July 24, 2015). 
 92 “In prescribing regulations under this section, the Director shall consider 
the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent 
system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to 
timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) 
(2012). 
 93 “Prescribing sanctions for abuse of discovery, abuse of process, or any 
other improper use of the proceeding, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost of the proceeding[.]” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 316(a)(6) (2012). 
 94 VirnetX did not allege that Mangrove had filed unmeritorious claims in 
their IPR petition. Patent Owners Response, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, 
Ltd., No. IPR2015-01046 at 14. 
 95 Decision, Mangrove Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. VirnetX, Inc., No. 
IPR2015-01046 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct.7, 2015). 
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merely implied that frivolous claims may succeed in a motion for 
sanctions. 
C. Goals of the Strategy and Implications of the Celgene Decision 
Not to Sanction 
Bass and other financiers use of IPR petitions to exploit the 
relatively new AIA is inventive. Although completely invalidating 
a company’s patent could cause a massive drop in that company’s 
share prices, which could presumably be one of Bass’s ultimate 
goals,96 he has had some success in short selling just based on 
market fears.97 With some of his recent petitions, Bass has had less 
success in causing a drop in stock prices with IPR petitions.98 In 
fact, and quite interestingly, some patent owner’s stocks spiked 
after news broke of one of Bass’s petitions, casting doubt as to 
whether other market factors had larger influences than his 
petitions.99 However, this type of gamble is not an uncommon 
occurrence.100 Either the market has caught on to his tactic and 
compensated for the volatility of dubious patents and the new IPR 
proceedings, or it is an overreaction to the initial news that a patent 
owned by a pharmaceutical company could be lost.101 However, 
with his most recent successes, combing through the empirical data 
                                                
 96 The theory is that a pharmaceutical company’s stock prices will fall after 
the market learns that an IPR petition that could invalidate one of their patents 
was filed. Additionally, if Bass and CFAD get an IPR instituted, that could also 
lead to a drop in stock prices because the chances that the patent may be 
invalidated increases. Thus, if the patent was actually invalidated, there could 
theoretically be an enormous drop in stock price because a portion of the 
pharmaceutical company’s business is now open to competition. 
 97 Sidak & Skog, supra note 11. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id.; Short Interest, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-
interest.aspx (updated daily). 
 101 One could argue that Bass and CFAD are bringing awareness to the market 
that they should value patents differently because there exists the opportunity 
that some patents are dubious and could be invalidated. Also, the first instance 
of Bass and CFAD filing an IPR petition might have been such a novel approach 
that the market did not fully understand implications, and market panic allowed 
the stock prices to drop. Infra note 105-06; but see infra note 107. 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 126 
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review 
would be helpful in elucidating how much effect the strategy has 
had. 
At this time, Bass and his copycats have evaded sanctions 
because he has filed every petition with non-frivolous claims. 
Preliminary responses arguing abuse of process or improper use of 
IPRs have failed since the PTAB’s October ruling denying 
Celgene’s motion for sanctions.102 Despite Bass’s announcements 
that he uses the CFADs as part of his investment strategy, the goal 
of the CFADs to invalidate weak patents for the public good103 is in 
line with the stated goals of the AIA, and might provide an extra 
barrier against claims of improper use and/or abuse of process. 
Furthermore, the PTAB itself announced that motivation, financial 
or altruistic, is not a factor when deciding who can file an IPR 
petition.104 Moreover, because the PTAB declined to express what 
actions constitute an abuse of process within the meaning of 35 
U.S.C. § 316(a)(6) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a), motions for sanctions 
based on abuse of process currently must fail. In ruling this way, 
the PTAB has made it clear that any change with regard to IPR 
proceedings should come in the form of direction from Congress. 
Although this recent development does not delve into all of the 
variables of the stock market and the finer empirical data, Cosmo’s 
stock price, which was on the rise from around $147 a share to 
$156 a share in late September to early October of 2015, began to 
plummet on October 6, and currently stands at just below $144 a 
share.105 This price decrease could be in response to the news that 
review of a Cosmo patent was instituted,106 and in any case, CFAD 
would have made a profit based on that news. However, in light of 
CFAD’s and other financier’s recent successes, the USPTO and 
                                                
 102 See, e.g., Coalition for Affordable Drugs III, LLC v. Jazz Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., No. IPR2015-01018 (P.T.A.B. Oct.18, 2015.). 
 103  By invalidating weak patents, cheaper generic drugs can enter the 
marketplace. 
104 See supra section III.B. 
 105  Share Price Chart, COSMO PHARMACEUTICALS, 
http://www.cosmopharmaceuticals.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 106 However, it is unknown whether the price decrease is significant; it might 
align with normal fluctuations in the market during this period. 
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PTAB may have decided correctly when they interpreted the goals 
of the AIA in the denial of Celgene’s motion for sanctions by 
placing equal weight between efficiency, cost, and invalidation of 
dubious patents by IPR. The next line of inquiry deals with 
whether the USPTO, or other branches of government, should do 
anything to address this new investment strategy, and what they 
can do. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION 
In determining what measures could be implemented to address 
the exploitation of the IPR procedure, governing bodies should 
first address whether or not it is advisable to do so. As described 
above, some of CFAD’s petitions have failed to cause a drop in 
patent holders’ stock prices; some stocks have even spiked after 
the news of pending petitions broke.107 Moreover, CFAD has been 
granted review of Cosmo’s drug patent, which might be 
invalidated to allow cheaper generics to enter the marketplace.108 
Now lies the question of whether or not the USPTO should take 
further action regarding the exploiting IPRs. If this investment 
strategy becomes less and less fruitful, fewer copycats will emerge 
and CFAD itself will most likely cease use of the IPR process, 
therefore PTAB will not become inundated with challenges 
motivated by short sale gains. However, some financiers’ recent 
successes in instituting review from their IPR petitions will 
probably increase the filing of petitions while taking a short 
position on the patent holder’s stock. Bass himself has argued in 
his opposition to patent owner’s motion for sanctions brief that 
motivations are inconsequential, and argues “[p]oor quality patents 
enable pharmaceutical companies to maintain artificially high drug 
prices and reap unjust monopoly profits paid for by consumers and 
                                                
 107 Sidak & Skog, supra note 11. 
 108 Matthew Bultman, Hedge Fun Group Gets Review of Bowel Disease Drug 
Patent, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2015, 7:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
712592/hedge-fund-group-gets-review-of-bowel-disease-drug-patent. 
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taxpayers.” 109  Bass also argues that invalidating “low quality” 
patents is one of the express goals of the AIA and IPR process.110 
Thus, Bass is betting that he can invalidate one patent, and views 
the reward as two-fold, that these tactics will: (1) allow cheaper 
generics to come in and lower healthcare costs for consumers; and 
(2) make money for his hedge fund. Is it truly an abusive 
application of IPR? 111  Since the PTAB explicitly stated that 
“[p]rofit is at the heart of nearly every patent and nearly every 
[IPR].”112 And if the market is adapting to the new AIA and its IPR 
procedures, as well as the CFAD’s strategy, the fear of abuse 
might be unwarranted. 113  By not taking a position on the 
investment strategy utilized by CFAD and its copycats, the PTAB 
might have chosen the preferable course; this path will allow the 
market to dictate future responses or enable Congress to step in 
and address the issue. This option least frustrates the purposes of 
the AIA and the IPR procedures because it still allows any third 
                                                
 109 Ryan Davis, PTAB Decision Not to Sanction Bass Shifts Focus to Capitol, 
LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
707985/ptab-decision-not-to-sanction-bass-shifts-focus-to-capitol; Opposition to 
patent owner’s motion for sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. 
Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 2 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2015). 
 110 The PTAB agreed with Bass’s arguments, or at least found them more 
persuasive than Celgene’s. See Decision denying motion for sanctions, Coalition 
for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. 
Sept. 25, 2015); Opposition to patent owner’s motion for sanctions, Coalition for 
Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 7 (P.T.A.B.  
Aug. 11, 2015). 
 111 On the other side of the argument is that “at the end of the day, a challenge 
to a possibly invalid patent is in the public’s best interest.” Decker, supra note 7. 
 112 Decision denying sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. 
Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2015); even a most 
innocuous third-party could have financial motivation behind an IPR petition, 
for instance, a non-profit that can use a successful invalidation as a selling point 
for more donations to their cause; Opposition to Patent Owners Motion for 
Sanctions, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. 
IPR2015-01092 at 1 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 2015) (“Generic pharmaceutical 
companies challenge patents to profit from generic sales.”). 
 113 Ronny Gal, an analyst for Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. stated that “The data 
accumulated so far, although early, suggests neither the attention, hyperboles, 
nor the legislative cure is warranted.” Decker, supra note 7. 
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party to file petitions to invalidate weak patents,114 and this route 
also does not alienate legitimate petitioners and organizations with 
altruistic motives that might fear sanctions for potential 
meritorious claims. 
However, letting the market adjust might also allow CFAD and 
other financiers to undermine a mission of the USPTO: to advance 
American innovation. 115  The USPTO’s limited time 116  and 
manpower is spent navigating less-than-sincere claims filed by 
these financial-minded 117  third parties with no interest in 
innovation by developing the technology contained within the 
patent. There is no guarantee that every petition filed by a third 
party will reach the merits; 118  which is concerning especially 
                                                
 114 See Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act (2011), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-begins-debate-on-leahy-
smith-america-invents-act. 
 115  The patent system operates by rewarding innovation by “securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries.” General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO 
(Oct. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents#heading-1 (quoting U.S.CONST. art. 1, § 8). 
 116 See supra, Part I; As prescribed by § 314(b), these petitions must be 
addressed within three months after preliminary response. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b) 
(2012). 
 117 By financial-minded, I mean people without a legitimate interest in the 
technology contained in the patent or industry. Already, some copycat financiers 
have borrowed CFAD’s strategy and filed petitions. Michelle Carniaux, PTAB 
Crashers: A Look at How They Are Doing In the PTAB, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 19, 
2015) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89b0247b-5614-4819-
a0f2-bd3f999e6a4e. One of which, Mangrove Partners Master Fund Ltd., 
succeeded where Apple did not, and was granted review of a network security 
patent. Davis, supra note 12. 
 118 “The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted 
unless the Director determines that the information presented in the petition filed 
under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 
of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). Because the 
PTAB declined to furnish a rule for when petitions become sanctionable, any 
petitioner with a semi-meritorious claim is not deterred from filing a petition, 
and if they are a financially-minded third party, such as a hedge fund that 
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considering that the PTAB has not established a standard for abuse 
of process other than implicitly suggesting that frivolous claims 
might be sanctionable. 119  Therefore, without action, Congress 
might have created something they sought to destroy by 
introducing the AIA: a next generation IPR troll. 
This next-gen troll could contravene the mission of the USPTO 
and actually stymie innovation. Any patent owner will need to 
allocate more funds for legal counsel in anticipation of action from 
next-gen trolls, which will detract from research and development 
of innovative technologies. For example, small companies that 
have become enticing targets will find it harder to afford the 
representation they need. For those companies, devoting 
significant resources to defending their patents even in an IPR 
proceeding could cripple their research efforts. An IPR troll might 
also act similarly to the patent troll, threatening patent owners with 
IPR petitions in an effort to negotiate settlements not to file. 
Furthermore, investing in targeted companies could be chilled if 
investors realize patents are under imminent threat at the hands of 
industry outsiders.120 Because there are currently no clear standards 
constituting a sanctionable use of IPR procedure, some attorneys 
believe it is currently open season for trolls to emerge.121 Despite 
potential benefits of nonintervention and allowing the market to 
adjust, intervention may be necessary, if only to prevent the rise of 
next-gen IPR trolls. 
                                                                                                         
partakes in short selling, there is no way to police the exploitation that could 
inundate the PTAB. 
 119  See Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, LLC v. Cosmo 
Technologies Ltd., IPR2015-00988 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2015) at 5-10; see, e.g., 
Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. 
Celgene Corp., IPR2015-01092, (Sept. 25, 2015). 
 120 Investors with a stake in the company might be wary of injecting further 
funds in the company if they are afraid that any person could invalidate patents. 
Potential investors would be repelled if they knew that the company was being 
targeted by IPR petitions because it could give the appearance of weak patent 
rights. 
 121 Davis, supra note 108. 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 107, 131 
Exploitation of Inter Partes Review 
V. METHODS OF INTERVENTION 
Next, this Recent Development considers the various methods 
by which the IPR process may be altered to address exploitation by 
outside parties looking to manipulate and cash in on stocks. Four 
administrative paths are readily available through: 122  (1) the 
USPTO; (2) the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); 
(3) judicial review; and (4) Congressional action. 
A. Administrative Action Through USPTO Regulation 
The USPTO has the power to establish regulations concerning 
the proceedings at the Office.123 Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), 
governing conduct of IPR, states that “[i]n prescribing regulations 
under this section, the Director shall consider the effect of any such 
regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the 
efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office 
to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”124 
Although the PTAB declined to announce new regulations or 
policy changes to deter short selling investment strategies when it 
delivered the written decision in the Celgene sanctions motion, the 
PTAB can still implement new regulations and policies should it 
deem the widespread use of CFAD’s investment strategy as 
exploitative and abusive. 125  Whether the PTAB correctly 
interpreted the statutes cited in its ruling denying sanctions 
                                                
 122 Although neither an extensive nor exhaustive list, these four paths are the 
most feasible options. 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012); “[T]he broadest of the Office’s rulemaking 
powers is the power to establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which 
. . . shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office . . . [b]y this grant of 
power we understand Congress delegated plenary authority over PTO 
practice[.]” Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 124 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012). 
 125 The agency can still propose a policy change through rulemaking pursuant 
to 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012); rules are defined as “[A]n agency statement of 
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or 
practice requirements of an agency . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
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requires that its interpretation pass the Chevron test.126 In Chevron, 
the Supreme Court elucidated a two-step test for evaluating an 
agency’s statutory interpretation: (1) whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue, and (2) if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court to decide is whether the agency’s interpretation is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.127 The PTAB’s 
interpretation of § 311 meant that any third party could file a 
petition, especially when compared to business method reviews128 
requiring standing pursuant to AIA § 18(a)(1)(B).129 The PTAB 
concluded the AIA “was designed to encourage the filing of 
meritorious patentability challenges, by any person who is not the 
patent owner, in an effort to further improve patent quality.”130 
Given the statutory language in § 311(a) granting “a person who is 
not the owner of a patent” the ability to file, PTAB’s interpretation 
likely passes Chevron, and any reviewing court would likely defer 
to the PTAB’s interpretations. Even if there was ambiguity, the 
fact that Congress implemented a standing requirement for covered 
business methods review but not IPR, points to a permissible 
construction of why IPR was not intended to have standing 
requirements. 
With USPTO interventions, there are two related inquiries: 
first, one must ask whether agency action contravenes its statutory 
                                                
 126 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
 127 Id. at 842–43. 
 128 Covered business methods patents are defined as a patent having claims: 
(1) used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or 
service, and (2) that do not claim a “technological invention.” 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.301(a); unlike IPR, they do not cover technological patents, and have an 
extra standing requirement that the petitioner must be sued or charged with 
infringement. Major Differences Between IPR, PGR, and CBM, USPTO, 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jsuVmflOpfYJ:www.us
pto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx+&cd=
3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (last visited on Oct. 5, 2015). 
 129 Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., 
IPR2015-01092 at 3–4 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015). 
 130 Id. at 4–5 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 85 (2011). 
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grant of power; and second, one should examine an agency’s 
possible solutions. The first line of inquiry asks whether Congress 
delegated the USPTO power to make any of the above proposed 
regulations. Congress has delegated power to the USPTO to 
regulate proceedings within the Office.131 Additionally, pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4), the Director can prescribe regulations 
establishing and governing IPR.132 Lastly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 316(b), the director, in establishing regulations, will take into 
account the effect on the economy, the integrity of the patent 
system, and the efficiency of the Office.133 
Having determined that the USPTO does have the power to 
intervene, there should be a balancing test weighing the effect on 
the economy against the interest in maintaining integrity of the 
patent system. Economic effect is double-edged sword: short 
selling stocks is a legal and regulated activity,134 but economic 
effect must also account for incentivizing technological 
innovations of the United States by providing robust patent rights. 
Similarly, while the integrity of the patent system is compromised 
when financiers can exploit the IPR process in a way not 
envisioned by Congress when it passed the AIA. At the same time, 
the integrity of the patent system is bolstered because any party 
can find and eliminate weak patents. If the issue persists and gains 
momentum, the PTAB might need to propose regulations to halt 
the investment strategy, increasing USPTO efficiency in the long 
run. If the PTAB continues to allow anyone to file petitions, more 
next-gen IPR trolls will be attracted and likely slow down a very 
enticing alternative to litigation that the AIA was intended to 
create.  
                                                
 131 See 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012); “The Director shall be responsible for 
providing policy direction . . . for the Office and for the issuance of patents . . . . 
The Director shall perform these duties in a fair, impartial, and equitable 
manner.” 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 132 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012). 
 133 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012). 
 134  Key Points About Regulation SHO, SEC (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm. 
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By declining to impose guidelines for sanctionable abuses of 
process, the PTAB has effectively thrust the issue back to 
Congress. As of today, the PTAB has also decided to stress that the 
motivation to invalidate weak patents is more relevant than an 
efficient alternative to litigation; whether or not that position 
changes given the increased usage of IPR remains to be 
determined. If the USPTO’s position changes, the agency can 
intervene to curtail petitions filed by uninterested third parties. 
1. USPTO Implementation of a Standing Requirement 
CFAD had argued, and the PTAB agreed, that the PTAB 
cannot currently sanction CFAD’s activity because its actions were 
consistent with § 311(a) and were pursuant to stated goals of the 
AIA. 135  Here, the USPTO can implement a gatekeeping 
requirement that only parties with a real interest in the technology 
underlying the challenged patent can bring IPR petitions. If the 
AIA implemented IPRs in part to eliminate low quality patents,136 
it follows that the most knowledgeable, and therefore successful, 
petitioners that can best eliminate those patents come from within 
the industry the patent resides.137 Therefore, a check on exploitative 
petitions could come by instituting a policy that required a 
demonstrated showing that petitioner’s RPIs are from that field, or 
have at least a minimum rationale for why they are linked to that 
field.138 This RPI requirement would ensure the integrity of the 
                                                
 135 Decision, Coalition for Affordable Drugs, VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp., 
IPR2015-01092 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015). 
 136 A goal that was stressed by the PTAB in their ruling not to impose 
sanctions on the CFAD. See id. 
 137 Given the fact that the majority of the IPR petitions filed by financiers are 
denied review, there is some sense that those intimately attuned to the 
underlying science and technology contained in a patent may be better suited to 
challenge them. See Chart, http://interpartesreviewblog.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/10/ChartUpdated2.png. 
 138 This may function as a carve-out exception for organization intending to 
benefit the public by invalidating weak patents, because they would have at least 
a minimum rationale linking them with the industry. However, it is worth noting 
that the CFADs were created with that same motive, but the distinction lies with 
the fact that eventually, the CFAD’s RPIs, Bass and Spangenberg, would be 
directly connected with hedge funds. There exists one interesting loophole: the 
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patent system in two ways. This system would ensure (1) weak 
patents are invalidated, and (2) that no party exploits a process 
within the USPTO for pecuniary gain ancillary to innovation. 
2. Rulemaking that Bars Hedge Funds or Short Sellers from 
Making IPR Petitions 
Currently, the feelings fostered by the pharmaceutical 
companies surrounding who can file IPR petitions can be reduced 
to one argument: one should not be able to use IPR for pecuniary 
gain through hedge funds, short selling, or other financial 
instruments.139 The USPTO may implement a regulation that bars 
the party filing the IPR petition from operating a hedge fund or 
operating a strategy for shorting stocks. This proposal seeks to 
expand the PTAB’s discretion by allowing discovery motions 
during initial stages of examining a petition. The pharmaceutical 
companies are upset because Bass uses his CFADs to “hide” his 
true intentions and sources of funds.140 However, the PTAB has 
rarely granted motions for discovery in order to explore “hidden” 
RPIs. 141  By granting more limited motions of discovery, the 
USPTO could let patent owners uncover if a hedge fund or short 
seller is a RPI in the petition. This regulation is narrowly tailored 
to only affect one group of people. However, if the PTAB needed 
to grant more discovery motions, it might be inconsistent at times 
with speedy and inexpensive resolution of proceedings pursuant to 
37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).142 Currently, of all the financiers that have 
filed IPR petitions, only Bass has filed a petition using a different 
company than his hedge fund.143 The USPTO may implement new 
                                                                                                         
scenario where a hedge fund manager teams up with an industry practitioner to 
challenge patents. 
 139 See, e.g., Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass eviscerates a drug company’s of his 
short-selling its stock, BUSINESS INSIDER, FINANCE (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bass-response-to-celgene-motion-2015-8. 
 140 Thakker & Ellison, supra note 83 at 4. 
 141 Id. 
 142 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2015) (“This part shall be construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every proceeding.”). 
 143 Chart, supra note 136. 
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policies and regulations if it ever finds that the short selling 
investment strategy becomes too much of a burden on the PTAB. 
B. The Role of the SEC with Regard to CFAD’s Investment 
Strategy 
So far, the SEC has remained curiously silent throughout the 
proceedings taking place at the intersection of the USPTO and 
financiers. The SEC may not have the tools it needs to effectively 
bring any claim against hedge funds and financiers. The two 
theories that could apply are extremely attenuated and nuanced at 
best: stock manipulation and insider trading.144 
The “word ‘manipulative’ . . . under SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . refers 
generally to practices that were intended to mislead investors by 
artificially affecting market activity.”145 A “misrepresentation or 
omission is material if there is substantial likelihood that [a] 
reasonable investor would have acted differently if 
misrepresentation had not been made or truth had been 
disclosed.” 146  Scienter is proven by demonstrating defendant’s 
                                                
 144 Nuanced and attenuated because neither theory has yet been applied by the 
SEC in this situation, it is likely to be one of first impression. 
 145 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that in 
order to prevail on claim of securities fraud, the SEC must establish the 
following elements: (1) misrepresentation or omission, (2) of material fact, (3) 
made with scienter). 
 146 See Armstrong v. Am. Pallet Leasing Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Iowa 
2009). Because reasonable investors would consider facts important in deciding 
whether to invest in a corporation’s stock, misrepresentations and omissions 
were material within meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78j and SEC Rule 10b-5 when a 
corporation’s executives make representations to potential purchasers of 
corporation’s outstanding stock involving false quarterly reports distorting true 
earnings, condition of a major division, antitrust litigation against that division, 
performance of a new product, and denial of a patent for such product. See Alna 
Capital Assoc. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff’d. in part, 
rev’d. in part on other grounds, 758 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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misconduct was knowing or intentional, or had the “intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud investors.”147 
In its Patent Owner’s Brief, NPS Pharmaceuticals argued that 
Bass and his CFADs were in fact conducting stock manipulation, 
prohibited by the SEC. NPS argued that the investment strategy is 
market manipulation because Bass “knows that an IPR can cause a 
stock’s price to fall,” and that Bass controls the timing of the stock 
price falling because he controls the timing of IPR petition filing.148 
NPS also argued that Bass violated SEC Rule 10b-5 when he made 
misrepresentations about invalidating NPS’s patents and inviting 
cheaper generics into the market, when he cannot be sure of the 
outcome.149 On October 23, 2015, the PTAB decided to institute 
review, while declining to address the issues of manipulation 
presented by NPS.150 
Under a traditional theory of insider trading, § 10(b) and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 “are violated when a corporate insider trades in the 
securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information.”151 Moreover, “[t]he misappropriation theory holds 
that a person commits fraud in connection with a securities 
transaction when he misappropriates confidential information for 
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source 
of the information.”152 
                                                
 147 See Wechsler v. Steinberg, 733 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1984); “‘[S]cienter’ is 
defined as mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 
SEC v. C. Jones & Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 148 Corrected Patent Owner’s Brief at 5, Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, 
LLC v. NPS Pharm., Inc., IPR2015-00990, (P.T.A.B Sept. 14, 2015). 
 149 Id. at 6. 
 150 See Coalition for Affordable Drugs II, LLC v. NPS Pharm., Inc., IPR2015-
00990, (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2015). 
 151 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (U.S. 1997). 
 152 “The misappropriation theory is thus designed to protect the integrity of 
the securities markets against abuses by outsiders to a corporation who have 
access to confidential information that will affect the corporation’s security price 
when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that corporation’s 
shareholders.” Id. at 653 (internal quotations omitted). 
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CFAD’s activity likely fails elements of market manipulation 
based on fraud or misrepresentations because CFAD’s IPR 
petitions are not misrepresentations. CFAD had merit to file each 
of its IPR petitions; otherwise the pharmaceutical companies 
would have alleged frivolous claims. Furthermore, because 
materiality is heavily fact-dependent, a pending legitimate IPR 
petition is but one fact a jury weighs in determining whether an 
investor would have purchased stock, and is far too speculative at 
the stage of deciding whether or not to institute review. The case 
for insider trading is likely one of first impression because IPR is a 
new proceeding in patent law. While Bass and other financiers 
may know they intend to file IPR petitions, current insider trading 
laws do not contemplate that behavior; instead, they only 
acknowledge nonpublic information from an inside source. 
C. Judicial Review 
Another way to deter exploitation of the IPR process is waiting 
for judicial review. Congress delegated the task of interpreting 
statutes, such as the AIA, to the courts in addition to the USPTO; 
this has been “evident since 1982, when Congress created a single 
specialized court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, to hear all appeals in patent cases.”153 However, patent 
cases can arise and be tried in district courts as well. There are pros 
and cons with policymaking from judicial review. Because 
technology and science are highly specialized and technical fields, 
fact-finding is sometimes complicated with arguments over 
terminology.154 Furthermore, a district court may have considerably 
                                                
 153  Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante 
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238 (2012); see also 
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to 
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1116–20 (2003) (discussing 
analogies between the patent and antitrust statutes and stating that “the patent 
statute, as currently structured, contemplates . . . judicial development of patent 
common law”). 
 154 The court acknowledged that the specific meaning of words in patent 
claims might be disputed, and external factual evidence might be needed to 
explain the meaning of the term. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, supra note 152. 
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less expertise than the USPTO or special committees in 
Congress.155 However, a court is not clouded by the politics that 
Congress or agencies can experience, and therefore can evaluate 
issues impartially. Courts examine issues one at a time, and 
judicial opinions are crafted to set policy and offer guidance on 
those individual issues. A final hurdle for a court-issued policy 
change is that the Federal Circuit needs the right case to come 
before it. Currently, there are no actionable claims that companies 
targeted by CFAD, and other third-party financiers, can bring 
before a court. The decision by the PTAB to not institute IPR 
review, such as the one garnered in the Celgene case, may not be 
appealed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314(d).156 However, pending 
cases may be directly appealable to the Federal Circuit in the near 
future. Both CFAD’s petition against Cosmo and Mangrove 
Fund’s petition against VirnetX had review instituted by the 
PTAB.157 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), “[i]f an inter partes 
review is instituted . . . the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall 
issue a final written decision . . . .”158 That final written decision is 
directly appealable to the Federal Circuit by the party losing the 
IPR.159 If either patent owner loses its review, that owner can 
appeal before the Federal Circuit for clarification of statute, or any 
other argument the party wishes to put forward. However, there are 
                                                
 155 Technical training is not only rare within chambers, but also highly 
focused on a single area of expertise; one cannot expect a clerk or judge to have 
a wide range of technical knowledge beyond his or her discipline. Id. 
 156 “The determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes 
review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) 
(2012); see, e.g., St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 
F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding denial of petition for inter partes review 
was not “final written decision” of Patent Trial and Appeal Board under 35 
U.S.C. § 318(a)). It should be noted that these statutes are silent as to whether a 
motion for sanctions is appealable. 
 157 See discussion of both cases supra Part III. 
 158 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). 
 159 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2012) (stating that “[a] party 
to an inter partes review . . . who is dissatisfied with the final written decision of 
the [PTAB] . . . may appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”) (emphasis added). 
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no guarantees for the court to provide new regulations or policy 
change. For instance, if a patent owner wishes to challenge the 
PTAB interpretation of § 311(a) giving any person the ability to 
file an IPR petition, the Federal Circuit will likely defer to the 
PTAB’s interpretation of the statute. Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit may choose to completely ignore any questions of statutory 
interpretation or the exploitation of IPR. Instead, it can review just 
the merits of the claims. But the avenue exists as a way to 
implement a policy change, especially if the landscape changes 
dramatically to inundate the PTAB in the time it takes for a case to 
reach the courts. 
D. Congressional Action 
Congress can enact legislation to reform the patent system and 
curtail the strategies that Bass and copycats employ to short 
stock.160 Because the PTAB’s ruling denying Celgene’s motion for 
sanctions and announcing that the PTAB loosely interprets 35 
U.S.C. § 311(a) to grant petitions filing rights to any person, and 
that the PTAB currently takes no position on the motivations of 
potential IPR petitioners, Congressional action may be the only 
viable avenue available for reform.161 Since the start of the 114th 
Congress, four new bills focused on patent reform have been 
introduced.162 Recently, the four bills have been reduced to two, 
                                                
 160 See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 161 Decision Denying Sanctions Motion, Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, 
LLC v. Celgene Corp., No. IPR2015-01092 at 4 (P.T.A.B. Sept 25, 2015). This 
is viable not because other avenues are closed, but rather because the USPTO 
seems to have thrust this job to Congress rather than making their own 
regulation when the PTAB stated that “Congress did not limit inter partes 
reviews to parties having a specific competitive interest in the technology 
covered by the patents,” and the CFAD’s petition is “consistent with the 
proposition that Article III standing is not a requirement to appear before [the 
PTAB] . . . .” See id. “Short of there being legislative action, this activity is 
going to continue . . . I continue to believe that the only fix for this issue is 
through an act of Congress[.]” Davis, supra note 12 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 162 The Innovation Act, the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship 
(PATENT) Act, the TROL Act, and the STRONG Act. Tony Dutra, Three Areas 
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one each in the House of Representatives163 and Senate.164 The 
Senate bill does not address the IPR procedure. The House Bill 
(“H.R.9”), seemingly in response to Bass and other financiers, 
takes up the challenge of reforming the IPR procedure head-on. It 
is proposing to effectively ban financiers from the IPR procedure 
by seeking to amend parts of § 316(a) of the AIA governing IPRs 
by introducing the qualifier: “[that petitioner and RPIs] do not own 
and will not acquire a financial instrument . . . that is designed to 
hedge or offset any decrease in the market value of an equity 
security of the patent owner[.]”165 Both bills seem to be losing 
support.166 
One method to amend 35 U.S.C. § 311 is to impose a standing 
requirement on the IPR procedure that only RPIs with a real 
competitive interest in the underlying technology contained in the 
patent be allowed to file petitions.167 However, that proposal is too 
far-reaching. Instituting such a drastic change would contravene 
the AIA’s goal of invalidating weak patents that should never have 
been issued because genuinely altruistic third parties (such as 
                                                                                                         
of Patent Trolling Behavior, Can Four Bills Become One?, LIFE SCIENCES LAW 
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groups for public interest) would be barred from petitioning. The 
current iteration of H.R.9 seems to deal with IPR petitions by 
hedge fund managers taking short positions because it narrowly 
tailors a rule that only bars those that aim to profit off of that 
activity. However, Congress can also elect to address the issue 
with by explicit means. They can amend § 316(a)(6) and define a 
boundary, or task the USPTO to establish a boundary that clearly 
encompasses what they consider to be a sanctionable abuse of the 
IPR process. Congress should pursue this path because it gives the 
USPTO more discretion to determine which parties have crossed 
that line into abusive tactics instead of declaring a whole group of 
potential petitioners banned from the IPR procedure. While 
Congress’s slow pace is its pitfall, it is also its virtue. A bill is 
debated, all angles get covered, experts are consulted, and the 
resulting legislation is a more wholesome remedy that hopefully 
functions as expected. This Recent Development proposes that the 
USPTO and PTAB were correct in the Celgene ruling to not 
impose sanctions. The PTAB was also wise to forgo 
announcements of any conclusive policy changes regarding 
investment strategies used by financiers until more data about the 
effect on the market and the IPR system can be analyzed. Finally, 
the PTAB’s decision in waiting for Congress to provide guidance 
and address the issue was the best choice because the PTAB 
remains neutral on a controversial issue of public interest.168  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
After investigating Bass’s hedge fund strategy and whether or 
not an abuse of process was really in play, this Recent 
Development has determined that it is best left to Congress to act 
to establish guidelines as to what constitutes an abuse of process 
and what constitutes actions that are sanctionable. Further, after 
discussing several options for intervention, this Recent 
Development concludes that the PTAB was wise to follow 
Congressional motivations in the adoption of the AIA to interpret 
their statutes. The PTAB effectively declined to establish a 
position on the exploitative use of IPR in short sales, and is instead 
waiting for Congressional intervention to address the issue 
surrounding prevention of the exploitation of the IPR procedure for 
purely financial gain. 
To find the best solution, further research should look at the 
empirical data resulting from Bass’s investment strategy and 
determine the viability and sustainability of the strategy in 
describing the potential effects on the USPTO. Notably, much of 
what lies ahead will be based on pending cases; the majority of 
Bass’s actions are currently before the PTAB, and many other 
financiers also have petitions pending. Once the PTAB issues more 
decisions, including some final decisions on patent claim validity, 
more pieces of this interesting puzzle will be revealed and any 
adjustment comes from their conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
